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Submission to the Leeds City Council Scrutiny Board (City Development) 
By Peter Bonsall 
I am Emeritus Professor of Transport Planning at the University of Leeds. My specialism has been 
demand forecasting and policy appraisal and I have been an advisor to numerous organisations 
including DfT, DTI, Cabinet Office, Highways Agency, EU Commission, US DOT, Rijkswaterstaad, 
Scottish Government, WYPTE, GMPTE, Leeds City council and other UK local authorities.  
I have taken a particular interest in the successive proposals for transport schemes in the A660 
corridor and was heavily involved in the NGT Public Inquiry as an expert witness on aspects of the 
Business Case and I conducted the main technical cross-examination of the consultants who 
appeared for the promoters.  
This document has been prepared for the ŽĂƌĚ ?ƐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐon 23rd November 2016 in response to its 
invitation to me to give my views on (1) the lessons to be learned and applied following the failure of 
the Supertram and NGT projects, (2) on local community engagement in the development of future 
transport schemes and projects and (3) on what solutions and options should be considered. 
 
1  Lessons to be learned from Supertram and NGT 
The history of the Supertram and NGT schemes is a sad one. It has involved considerable waste of 
public resources, decades of delay in addressing >ĞĞĚƐ ?ƐƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĂŶĚĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ
ĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐƉĞŽƉůĞĂŶĚďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐ ? It is tempting to blame Whitehall and Westminster 
for having seemed to encourage the projects and ultimately to have refused to fund them but I 
believe that much of the problem lies closer to home.  
Respecting Supertram, the problem seems to have been one of unrealistically high ambitions; the 
scheme for which funding was eventually sought was clearly larger than DfT were willing to accept 
and its business case was not sound. These proved to be fatal flaws when combined with unfortunate 
timing - had a smaller scheme been brought forward while tram schemes were popular with 
government then Leeds might have received funding for a scheme which might later have been 
extended.  
Respecting NGT, the eventual rejection of the scheme at the Public Inquiry was due to the 
fundamental weakness of its Business Case (opposition from local communities and businesses was 
significant but would not have swayed the Inspector had the Business Case been sound). This 
weakness was, in my opinion, due to an over-hasty decision to pursue a trolleybus scheme as a kind 
of  “ƐƵƉertram-ůŝƚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŽŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚthe main part of the scheme in the A660 corridor - where 
segregation from other traffic is difficult to achieve.  
Following its rejection of Supertram, the Government invited Leeds to submit a bus-based scheme to 
address its transport problems. The invitation could have been responded to in various ways each of 
which could have resulted in significant and rapid improvements to Leeds ?Ɛ transport system. The 
decision to pursue a trolleybus scheme seems to have been swayed by the fact that it would allow 
the scheme to be pursued via a Transport and Works Act Order - thereby allowing the promoters to 
control its operation and take the revenues - and by the fact that it appeared able to make use of 
much of the design work which had previously been done for Supertram (even though, in practice, 
much of the design work had to be revised). The decision to focus on the A660/A61 route was 
Appendix G
undoubtedly influenced by the prospect of abstracting a significant share of the revenues currently 
enjoyed by buses in the A660 corridor.  
The decision to implement a trolleybus scheme in the A660/A61 corridors having been made, it 
evidently proved imƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƌŽďƵƐƚƐĐŚĞŵĞǁŚŝĐŚŵĞƚƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐǁŝĚĞƌŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?given 
the government injunction that the scheme should not have an unduly adverse impact on other 
traffic, it was not possible to squeeze a trolleybus into the A660 corridor without compromising the 
performance of the new mode). Although this problem should have been recognised at an early stage 
and an alternative approach explored, what actually happened was that a case for the trolleybus 
scheme was prepared relying on some quite extraordinary assumptions, playing down the negative 
impacts of the scheme and ignoring the potential benefits of alternative approaches  (the Business 
Case did ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĂƐŽĐĂůůĞĚ “EĞǆƚĞƐƚůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚof a  “>ŽǁŽƐƚKƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?but the 
ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐĂƌĞŽŶƌĞĐŽƌĚĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞǀĂƌŝĂŶƚƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐ
the best alternatives to NGT that could have been developed). The failure seriously to consider other 
options was not only bad practice (because it resulted in more cost-effective options being ignored) 
but was contrary to government advice and was criticised by the Inspector. 
Some senior staff and councillors were clearly unaware of the fundamental weaknesses in the 
Business Case which came to light during the Inquiry. A detailed and impartial examination of the 
case at an early stage would have revealed a number of issues of real concern - most notably that the 
forecasts for trolleybus revenue and job creation were based on some quite extraordinary 
assumptions which were contrary to available evidence, and that, even on the basis of the flawed 
forecasts, the trolleybus scheme clearly failed to meet many of the objectives which had been set for 
it (see appendix).  
 
One can speculate as to why the fundamental weaknesses of the trolleybus scheme were not 
acknowledged at an early stage and why they did not emerge until the public Inquiry. Had senior 
people committed themselves to the scheme so publicly that they felt unable to withdraw their 
support? ,ĂĚƚŽŽŵƵĐŚŽĨ>ĞĞĚƐ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝŶtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌďĞĞŶƵƐĞĚƵƉŝŶůŽďďǇŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞ
scheme? Had ƚŚĞƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚrole in overcoming barriers to development been given so 
much emphasis that its abandonment might have ŚĂƌŵĞĚƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŶĞǁ
developments? Had so much time, effort and resources been invested in the scheme that 
abandonment seemed inconceivable ?,ĂĚƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐfailed to inform their clients of 
the weaknesses in the case (perhaps thinking it would be impolitic to be seen to be questioning the 
case for the scheme)? Had the consultants themselves not recognised the weaknesses? 
The role of consultants in the whole process deserves particular attention and it is interesting to note 
that the brief given to the main analytical consultants was apparently ƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƌƐ ?
attempts to achieve funding for the identified scheme. There seems to have been no serious effort by 
Leeds or METRO to seek advice on whether the trolleybus scheme represented the best response to 
the Government ?ƐŝŶǀŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽƌŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞbusiness case was robust. The employment of 
competent and independent expert advisors at an early stage could have avoided the eventual 
outcome. The appendix to this note exemplifies the specific issues which an independent assessor 
might have been asked to address and the issues which their investigation might have uncovered had 
they been given full access to the relevant material.  
As to the role of Whitehall and Westminster in the NGT story, it is understandable that the rejection 
of the NGT scheme might leave Leeds feeling let down after receiving seemingly encouraging noises 
at earlier stages. However, it should be noted that the decisions to pursue a trolleybus option and to 
implement it in the A660 corridor were made by the promoters rather than by DfT or ministers and 
that successive letters from DfT made it clear that their approval of the scheme at the various interim 
stages was always subject to their approval at subsequent stages and most particularly to their 
acceptance of the Final Business Case.  There is ample evidence (quoted at the Inquiry) to indicate 
that DfT officials had reservations about various aspects of the scheme and no doubt at all that the 
Inspector concluded that the scheme was flawed. There was clearly a substantial amount of political 
lobbying for the scheme and some suggestion in a speech by former Minister of Transport Norman 
Baker that there had been political pressure to grant approval to the scheme at one (at least) of the 
milestones. It may be that efforts of friendly ministers to help the scheme proceed despite their 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚions simply delayed the eventual outcome.  
The Public Inquiry may have seemed like an expensive inconvenience and source of delay to the NGT 
project but Leeds should be thankful that there was a mechanism which resulted in the weaknesses 
of the scheme becoming known before it was too late. Without it, more resources would have been 
expended and the project would have passed to the next stage (submission of the Final Business 
Case).  If DfT/Treasury scrutiny had been rigorous at this final stage the scheme would not have got 
funding but, worse, if the scrutiny had been superficial the scheme would have proceeded, much 
more money would have been spent and the inherent problems would eventually have come to light 
only when it became operational  W with ongoing costs to the city and irreversible damage to the 
urban landscape and to local accessibility. Post devolution, with a reduced role for DfT, the need for 
this kind of mechanism, and for rigorous internal scrutiny of proposals, will be greater than ever. 
It is no secret that many Leeds Councillors were surprised at the strength of opposition to the NGT 
scheme from some of the people who, it was thought, would stand to benefit most from it. This 
surprise was, in no small part, due to the fact that the promoters were relying on the positive results 
of a consultation exercise which had been conducted several years earlier on the general proposal for 
a rapid transit network. When people and small businesses along the route learned about the actual 
proposal they were unconvinced that the benefits claimed for it would outweigh the negative 
impacts on the local communities and townscape. The proposed scheme did not reflect their needs 
and aspirations and indeed tended to work against them. It may have been assumed that local 
businesses would follow the lead of a number of developers and large employers who had indicated 
support for the scheme but, in fact, the small businesses shared many of the concerns of local 
residents and community groups regarding the adverse impacts that the scheme would have had on 
local ambience and accessibility.  
There was a significant budget for outreach and consultation but the effort seems to have been 
focussed on publicising the supposed benefits of the scheme rather than on genuine consultation. 
Local people and businesses were dismayed to learn that, although they were being invited to 
comment on detailed aspects of the proposal, the main features of the scheme were to be taken as 
given.   
The existence of significant local opposition was noted by the Inspector and, even though it did not 
feature prominently among his reasons for rejecting the scheme, it will not have helped the 
promoters ?ĐĂƐĞ ? Similarly, his confidence in the technical ability of the promoters ?ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐ will 
have been reduced by the fact that they had to acknowledge a numbers of errors in the analysis 
which came to light only after submission of their documents. Although the preparation of the 
trolleybus scheme had taken a considerable period of time, the technical work had clearly not been 
fully checked in advance of the Inquiry (revised calculations of key benefits were submitted by the 
promoters after submission of their proofs of evidence and further errors came to light during cross-
examination of their consultants). 
Finally, it must be recognised that the focus on Supertram and then on NGT has meant that other, 
projects have been side-lined. The effect is particularly evident along the proposed trolleybus route 
where alternative, less glamorous but much more cost-effective, solutions to the undoubted local 
problems have simply not been pursued, but the diversion of so much time, effort and resources into 
Supertram and NGT must also have delayed the development of strategy and implementation of 
more modest schemes and proposals across the city as a whole.  
So what are the lessons? 
I. The decision to pursue a particular approach or scheme should be made only after serious 
consideration of alternatives. 
II. Politicians should not commit themselves too firmly to any particular scheme before it has 
been subject to rigorous analysis. 
III. Attempts to influence opinion (of the public, of the business community or of the 
Government) in favour of a particular scheme should not begin until it is clear that it is 
actually the best option.  
IV. Consultants engaged to provide technical advice and assistance should be required to 
provide an honest and unbiased assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of each option 
rather than simply to provide analysis which supports a favourite scheme. This will become 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĂƐĨd ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶǀĞƚƚŝŶŐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐŝƐƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ ? 
V. Independent experts should be brought in to check the robustness of the analyses and, again, 
ƚŚŝƐǁŝůůďĞĐŽŵĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĂƐĨd ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶǀĞtting proposals is reduced; 
VI. The high level of local opposition to the trolleybus scheme resulted from the fact that the 
scheme did not address the needs and aspirations of the local communities and businesses 
and was exacerbated by the belief that the consultation had been inadequate (see below).  
VII. Undue concentration on a single major project diverts attention from the development of 
alternative strategies and from the implementation of less glamourous but potentially much 
more cost effective projects. 
 
 
2  Public engagement and involvement in the delivery of transport schemes and projects 
Genuine public consultation is generally hampered by communication difficulties. Unlike large 
corporates, the public often have disparate needs and aspirations which are difficult for policy 
makers to understand and reconcile and because the public are, in turn, rarely equipped to 
understand the detailed arguments put forward by policy analysts and technical experts. Their views 
and opinions may not become clear until specific proposals are articulated. 
If the aim is to develop strategies and schemes which reflect the needs and aspirations of 
communities and stakeholders it is important first to find out what those needs and aspirations are.  
This requires an approach designed to understand those needs and aspirations rather than to 
promote any particular scheme or project. There is little poŝŶƚŝŶǁĂƐƚŝŶŐƚŝŵĞŽŶ “ŵŽƚŚĞƌŚŽŽĚĂŶĚ
ĂƉƉůĞƉŝĞ ?ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌƐĂƌĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇŬŶŽǁŶ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞƉĞŽƉůĞǁĂŶƚĨĂƐƚĞƌ ?ĐŚĞĂper, 
more comfortable, reliable and safer journeys, of course they want faster boarding times, of course 
they support the notion of a modern, fast and comfortable transport system) rather it is to identify 
perceived problems and to explore the trade-offs between different priorities.  
The identification of problems should be unprompted and the trade-offs should seek to find out how 
people would prioritise between, for example; local access versus access to the city centre; easy 
access by car versus easy access by public transport; the needs of pedestrians and cyclists versus 
those of users of cars and buses; the needs of pedestrians versus those of cyclists; low fares versus 
high frequency; high frequency versus improved reliability; improvements in air quality versus 
economic growth; preservation of local townscape versus amelioration of congestion  ... and so on. 
Other trade-offs have a very clear policy content but should not be shunned: expansion of Leeds 
Bradford Airport versus direct trains to Manchester Airport; improved rail access to other Yorkshire 
towns and cities versus faster rail access to larger cities elsewhere in the UK  Q and so on. It is also 
useful to establish the willingness of communities and stakeholders to help pay for necessary 
improvements. Are they willing to see increased local taxation? Would they accept higher parking 
charges? Would they accept introduction of a congestion charge or of bottleneck-charges? Would 
they accept higher fares on buses or trains? 
The investigation of needs, aspirations and trade-offs will reveal widely held aspirations and 
widespread needs but will also reveal inconsistencies and potential conflicts of interest. Policy 
analysts and decision makers then have the difficult task of developing technically sound strategies 
and proposals which are likely to deliver the greatest good for the greatest number. 
Once policy proposals emerge, the involvement of community groups and stakeholders in the design 
process can engender a sense of engagement with, and even of  “ŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ŽĨ, the resulting 
schemes. However, even if this approach is followed, it cannot hope to silence all opposition to a 
given scheme - some people will always feel that their views have been ignored or that those of other 
groups have been allowed to dominate. If the overall benefits of a proposal are overwhelming, it may 
simply become necessary to ignore opposition from narrow sectional interests. 
Finally, the process of garnering public and stakeholder support for a particular option is quite 
different from consultation and should be kept quite separate from it. 
 
3   Policy options for the short, medium and longer term 
In keeping with the general objective of promoting a high level of affordable and environmentally 
benign accessibility, I would advocate a strategy for Leeds which seeks to make the best use of 
available networks and to improve them incrementally rather than to introduce a wholly new system 
simply for the sake of it. Similarly I endorse the ĐŝƚǇ ?ƐĂǀŽǁĞĚstrategy of seeking to encourage, 
where possible, the use of public transport and of active modes in preference to the private car. 
Interventions designed to promote these objectives should address existing and foreseeable 
problems.  
>ĞĞĚƐ ?Ɛ existing strategies are generally sound but, in my opinion, they have been too closely linked 
to the introduction of  new modes and the progress towards achievement of some key objectives has 
been disappointing. In particular, more needs to be done to tackle air pollution, to prioritise the 
needs of pedestrians, to reduce the dominance of cars in the urban landscape, and to improve the 
public transport offer. There also seems to have been relatively limited success in forward planning 
to ensure that major new developments are designed to promote use of public transport rather than 
of the private car. 
It would, of course be inconsistent if I were to suggest that any specific proposal should be adopted 
without full analysis of its likely performance but I believe that there are some obvious candidates for 
consideration.    
In the very short term there is much that could be achieved at relatively low cost by means of simple 
traffic management, minor engineering and/or administrative action. Examples include:  
x agreement with bus operators to introduce newer less polluting vehicles, measures to speed 
up boarding times and increase service reliability, and better integration with rail services;  
x provision of bus lanes where buses are held up in congestion and the existing carriageway 
can accommodate an extra lane or where existing space can be reallocated to buses
1
;  
x use of existing signals to prioritise buses (sometimes in conjunction with minor traffic 
engineering measures, such as banned turns, designed to increase junction capacity); 
x provision of faster response to pedestrian calls at a number of signalised crossing points;  
x improved facilities at rail stations and major bus stops (including continued roll-out of real-
time bus information and provision of improved pick-up and set-down arrangements at 
Leeds City Station);  
x introduction of newer rolling stock on the commuter rail services;  
x introduction of a low emission zone within the city centre (and perhaps, in due course, 
through some of the suburban centres); 
x low-cost measures to reduce car traffic into the city centre (e.g. use of available land to 
provide parking adjacent to suburban rail stations and upstream of bottlenecks on radial 
routes into the city centre, reduction in long-stay parking facilities in the city centre) 
x banning of HGVs on certain roads during peak hours;  
x enforcement of speed limits and parking restrictions in sensitive areas;  
x more prominent signing of pedestrian routes; and 
x  “ƐŵĂƌƚ ?ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐshort term bike rental and the re-ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ǁĂůŬŝŶŐďƵƐĞƐ ?- 
perhaps in tandem with provision for set down and pick up away from school gates.  
In the slightly longer term much might be achieved by relatively modest engineering to provide: 
x increased rail capacity and turn-round facilities to enable more frequent services on the 
suburban stretches of regional rail lines; 
x minor carriageway widening or re-alignment to provide additional bus lanes where 
necessary and appropriate; 
x new signals providing priority to buses (including some  “ďƵƐŐĂƚĞƐ ? ?;
x improved facilities for pedestrians and cyclists (including provision of more attractive 
pedestrian routes into the city centre);  
x additional parking at those suburban rail stations which can act as park and ride sites; 
x congestion relief at certain bottlenecks (though consideration must be given to the extent to 
which this might encourage additional road traffic). 
                                                             
1
 Interestingly, this, together with several other low cost items in this list, could make a real contribution to the solution of 
problems in the A660 corridor (the problems have long been recognised  W most recently by the Inspector at the NGT 
enquiry -  but their solution has been repeatedly postponed pending arrival of Supertram and then of NGT. Meanwhile the 
problems have not gone away: congestion persists, the pollution levels in Headingley are amongst the worst in the city, 
and 8 of the 44 sites in Leeds which give most cause for concern over safety are to be found in the corridor). A more 
detailed description of potential solutions ĨŽƌƚŚĞ ? ? ?ĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌŵĂǇďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶWĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ “ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ
produced by the North West Leeds Transport Forum ; 
http://nwltf.org.uk/docs/ngt/Alternative%20Transport%20strategy%20discussion%20doc.pdf 
In the medium term, but with preparations starting now, a number of more ambitious proposals 
deserve urgent attention
2
. They include:  
x introduction of more rail-based park and ride stations  adjacent to the motorways or outer 
ring road (e.g. a new park and ride station at  Horsforth Woodside
3
 next to the outer ring 
road could help reduce traffic on the A65, the A660 and on the roads in between and, since 
introduction of a new station will inevitably prolong the journey from more distant stations, 
consideration might simultaneously be given to replacing the Headingley and Burley Park 
stations by a new one at Headingley Stadium); 
x provision of other new rail stations  W particularly in conjunction with major developments 
such as the new housing to the east of the city (where a stretch of new line might also be 
justified) and southwest of Horsforth (where a new station next to the Outer Ring Road on 
the old Sandoz site might also fulfil a useful P&R function); 
x provision of increased capacity at Leeds City Station and of longer platforms at some other 
stations (to facilitate longer trains and thus help reduce crowding on commuter services into 
Leeds);  
x measures to reduce the dominance of car traffic on approaches to the city centre (in addition 
to traffic engineering measures designed to reduce through traffic, a substantial reduction in 
the number of cars entering the city centre might be achieved by introducing congestion 
charging, bottleneck charging, or increased parking charges or by significantly reducing the 
provision commuter parking in the city centre. However, such measures could harm the 
competitiveness of the Leeds economy unless public transport system has by then become a 
viable and genuinely attractive alternative); 
x engineering and/or advanced signal technologies to provide increased capacity at key 
bottlenecks ŽŶ>ĞĞĚƐ ?ƐŽƌďŝƚĂůƌŽƵƚĞƐ(such as at the Armley Gyratory  junction and at various 
intersections along the outer ring road). 
The need for a new high capacity light rapid transport (LRT) system has yet to be proven. Leeds may 
be unique among large cities in not having such a system but that fact alone is insufficient reason to 
pursue that option because the geography of Leeds is also unique. There appears to be space to 
accommodate LRT in some of the radial corridors and, hopefully, the layout of new developments 
such as those on the South Bank have been designed to accommodate LRT services. However, further 
analysis is required to establish whether the benefits of an LRT system could not be delivered more 
quickly and at lower cost by a combination of more intensive use of the existing heavy rail network 
(with some extensions and new stations) and a serious commitment to real improvements in bus 
provision including an uncompromising approach to bus priority
4
.   
                                                             
2
 A longer list of candidate schemes and policies for is provided in part B of  Et>d& ?Ɛ “ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ.  
3
 The idea of a P&R site at Horsforth Woodside is not new but it is interesting to note that one of the reasons given for not 
pursuing it was that it would compete with the proposed NGT P&R site at Bodington! 
4
 At the limit, a bus with absolute priority over other road traffic or benefitting from its own segregated track, can perform 
as effectively, or better than, a rail-based LRT system.  
Appendix  
Briefing Document for an independent analyst seeking to assess the case for Trolleybus as 
presented at Public Inquiry   (prepared 27/02/15 and revised in August 2015 to include reference to 
Devolution powers) 
This document sets out some questions on which an independent analyst would wish to form a view. 
Under each question, attention is drawn to important evidence drawn from documents produced at 
the Inquiry  W ŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞŵďǇĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚƐ ?ŽǁŶĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐ ?dŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ P 
A. ŽĞƐƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƐĐŚĞŵĞĨŝƚǁŝƚŚ>ĞĞĚƐŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?
B. Are the revenue forecasts reliable? 
C. What implications would local control of buses (via a Quality Bus Contract or as part of a 
devolution agreement) have for the Trolleybus project? 
D. Were the performance and impacts of the trolleybus scheme accurately modelled? 
E. Is the result of the Cost Benefit Analysis credible?  and 
F. Were alternative solutions properly investigated? 
Further observations, directly addressing the issues on which the Secretaries of State wished to be 
informed by the Inquiry, are provided in the Closing Statement by North West Leeds Transport Forum 
(NWLTF). It, along with the documents referred to in the footnotes, is an Inquiry Document which can 
be found on the PA website http://www.persona.uk.com/LTVS/index.htm .   
A. ŽĞƐƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƐĐŚĞŵĞĨŝƚǁŝƚŚ> ?Ɛobjectives (i.e. improved quality of life, reduced 
emissions, increased economic activity, etc.; as set out in the LDP and elsewhere)? 
1. According to predictions set out in the Business Case and other documents  prepared by the 
ƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐ ?ŝŶƚƌŽduction of the trolleybus would result in: 
i. increased car mileage
5
, emissions
6
 and casualties
7
 (these predictions are due, not to the 
stimulation of extra trips, but to the fact that existing trips would become more 
circuitous), 
ii. reduced use of active modes
8
, 
iii. increased average journey times during the morning peak (summed across all modes)
9
, 
iv. increased congestion (measured as lower average journey speeds for cars)
10
, 
v. reduced connectivity (measured as increased average generalised cost of travelling  W 
summed across all modes and time periods)
11
, 
vi. increased noise nuisance
12
,  
vii. adverse impact on landscape and townscape
13
 and on heritage assets
14
, 
                                                             
5
  Section C15 of NWLTF122  W original evidence from Table 58 of C-1-8 supplemented by data in first table of 
the penultimate page of APP103. 
6
 Table B1 of APP-7-3 
7
  Para 15.85 of C-1 also in Table 17.12 of C-1 
8
  Section C15 of NWLTF122  W original evidence in Table 12.4 of C-1 supplemented by data in first table on 
penultimate page of APP103 
9
  Section C9 of NWLTF122  W original evidence from APP103 page 7 
10
  See Table 7 of C-1-9 
11
  Against a background of no increase in overall trip numbers, answer 8 in APP-105 shows increased person 
miles and answer 9 shows increased journey time (in each case summed over all modes for the morning 
peak). This implies increased trip cost. Note that these results relate only to the morning peak but that 
mileage data in APP-122 suggests that the effect is present in all time periods.  
12
  Para 17.28 and Table 17.11 of C-1 
13
  Para 17.28 and Table 17.11 of C-1 
viii. no significant shift from car to public transport (the majority of trolleybus users would 
otherwise have travelled by bus or train
15
 and the reduction in car trips is only half that 
in active mode trips
16
). 
2. ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŵĂĚĞďǇƚŚĞƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐ ?ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
trolleybus would worsen the public transport offer in several respects: 
i. the public transport frequency from any given stop would be lower (current headway at 
stops on the A660 is 3 minutes, proposed headway at trolleybus stops, and at bus stops, 
is 6 minutes)
17
, 
ii. the overall public transport seating capacity (measured as number of seats provided per 
hour) would be reduced
18
,  
iii. almost all bus journeys would take longer door-to-door than they currently do
19
, 
iv. door-to-door journey times by trolleybus would be longer than they currently are by bus 
for many journeys in the A660 corridor
20
, 
v. passengers would, on average, have further to walk (a simple consequence that the 
average distance between trolley stops
 
 would be greater than that between existing bus 
stops) . 
vi. origins and destinations on bus routes #1 and #6 which are not directly served by the 
trolleybus would have a reduced service (notably #1 beyond Bodington Fields and 
between Hunslet and Beeston, #6 in Cookridge/Tinshill and between the Merrion Centre 
and the Bus station)
21
, 
vii. interchange between trolleybus and bus would be less easy than it currently is between 
bus and bus (due to separation of stops  W consider for example the journey from Leeds 
City station to Adel which is currently effected by transferring from #1 to #28 at 
Headingley Arndale Centre)
22
. 
3. The impact on economic activity is likely to be negative because, as noted at A.1.v above, 
introduction of the trolleybus would result in reduced connectivity. The prediction by the 
Urban Dynamic Model (UDM) that there would be a positive impact on employment does not 
fit this expectation. Closer examination reveals that this is because the UDM treated an 
assumed willingness to pay to ride on trolleybuses as if it were a real time saving, and because 
it ignored: 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
14
   Paras 14.209-211 of C-1 indicate negative impact on heritage assets although Para 14.213 apparently 
suggests that, over time, this would cease to matter because people would get used to the new situation!  
15
   Table 12.4 in C-1 
16
   Section C15 of NWLTF122 - original data from letter from AECOM to NWLTF (reproduced as NWLTF112). 
17
   Para 11.22 of C-1 
18
  The Promoters envisage 8 fewer buses per hour. FWY144 indicates that each bus has 72 seats so this implies 
a loss of 576 bus seats per hour. This would be offset by an increase of up to 440 seats on trolleybuses  W 
assuming the stated peak frequency of 11 vehicles per hour and assuming 40 seats per trolleybus (a value 
which, according to evidence in section C7 of NWLTF122, cannot be exceeded if space is to be preserved for 
the anticipated peak loading). The net effect would therefore be a loss of 136 seats during the peak hour. 
19
   Section C2 of NWLTF122  W original data from Appendix A of C-1-13 
20
   Section C3 of NWLTF122, using data from Appendix A of C-1-13, demonstrates this for journeys from West 
Park to Merrion Centre. It is alsŽƚƌƵĞĨŽƌũŽƵƌŶĞǇƐƚŽƚŚĞ^ƚ:ŽŚŶ ?ƐĞŶƚƌĞ ?dŚĞsŝĐƚŽƌŝĂYƵĂƌƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ'ƌĂŶĚ
Theatre, West Yorkshire Playhouse, Leeds bus station, the new Victoria Gate development and indeed to 
much of the city centre. The effect is even more marked for journeys which do not need to pass through 
Headingley 
21
   ŽŵƉĂƌĞE'dƌŽƵƚĞŵĂƉǁŝƚŚƌŽƵƚĞƐŽĨďƵƐĞƐ 뜃?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?Ő ?ŽŶDĞƚƌŽ ?ƐǁĞďƐŝƚĞ- 
http://www.wymetro.com/uploadedFiles/WYMetro/Content/BusTravel/maps_and_guides/Leeds_Route_Map.pdf 
22
   See B114.2 in NWLTF122 
i. the increased time and cost suffered by cars and commercial vehicles
23
, 
ii. the costs and disruption to business during construction
24
.   
 
B. Are the revenue forecasts reliable? 
1. The revenue forecast relies on some very controversial assumptions all of which will tend to 
have exaggerated the trolleybus revenues. Namely: 
i. That people would choose to travel on a trolleybus rather than on a bus or a train even 
if, ceteris paribus, the trolleybus took 5.5 minutes longer (or cost about 15 pence more) 
than the bus or train
25
. This assumption, which is in addition to assumptions about the 
superiority of boarding point facilities discussed at B.1.iii below, was said to be justified 
by the results of Stated Preference (SP) work conducted in Leeds. However the SP 
surveys had actually shown a marginal reluctance to travel on trolleybuses
26
 and the 5.5 
minute value was actuĂůůǇĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽƉĂǇƚŽƚƌĂǀĞůŽŶĂ “ǀĞƌǇ
ŶĞǁďƵƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŽŶĂŶ “ŽůĚďƵƐ ?27!  
ii. dŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚƌĂǀĞůŽŶƚƌŽůůĞǇďƵƐĞƐǁŽƵůĚĞǆŝƐƚŝŶƉĞƌƉĞƚƵŝƚǇ28.  
This was assumed despite the fact that, as noted above, the Leeds SP work had shown a 
strong preference for new vehicles and that, during the life of the project, it is 
reasonable to assume that there would be times when the bus fleet is newer than the 
trolleybus fleet.  
iii. That, over and above the 5.5 minute preference discussed above, the superior quality of 
facilities at the trolleybus boarding points would mean that people would be prepared to 
use trolleybuses even if a bus or train was cheaper and quicker. The average value of this 
assumed preference was 5.8 minutes for buses
29
 and 8.1 minutes for train
30
. The average 
values of the total assumed preference for trolleybus over bus and rail are thus 11.3 (5.5 
+5.8) and 13.6 (5.5+8.1) minutes respectively. It should be noted that: 
a. The boarding point quality factors were derived from the Leeds SP work and are 
significantly higher than values typically found in research elsewhere
31
.  
                                                             
23
   Table 7 of C-1-9 indicates increased time and distance for road based traffic. Paragraphs 3.6 to 3.11 of C-1-
18 describe the travel costs which were input to the UDM but contain no reference to the increased car 
costs. Mr Chadwick confirmed, under cross-examination, that the UDM forecasts ignored the increases in 
the generalised costs of road-based traffic.  
24
   Mr Chadwick confirmed, under cross examination that the effects of disruption during construction on 
generalised costs of travel had not been estimated (and so cannot have been included in the inputs to the 
UDM).  
25
   Value confirmed for bus in answer 3 in APP103, the fact that it was also applied to trains was confirmed by 
Mr Hanson under cross-examination. A similar preference was effectively assumed for travelling on 
trolleybuses rather than by car or active mode but the precise magnitude is difficult to quantify (it is a 
function of the composite cost passed through the nests in the hierarchical model of mode choice). 
26
   This fact was not revealed in any of the documentation sent to DfT. Nor was it revealed to the Inquiry until it 
was documented in APP155 (Table 1 indicates that the willingness to pay to travel on a trolleybus rather 
than on a bus is minus 2.76 pence).  
27
   Under cross examination, Mr Chadwick justified the use of the preference for new buses over old buses to 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŶĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƚƌŽůůĞǇďƵƐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƌƐ ?aspiration that 
trolleybuses would be perceived as being that much better than buses. He was unable to quote any other 
support for the assumption. See further discussion in B21 of NWLTF122.  
28
   Answer 3 in APP103 confirmed that the same penalty was applied in 2031 as in 2016 
29
   Combining answers 1 and 2 in APP103, we have 7.1 minus 1.3 = 5.8  
30
   Combining the answer given in APP172 with answer 2 from APP103, we have 9.4 minus 1.3= 8.1. 
31
   A comparison of the values derived from the Leeds SP work with those derived from work elsewhere was 
provided for DfT (and is reproduced in C-2-4) but it was misleading in that it compared an average of the 
b. A possible reason for the unusually high values placed on the provision of CCTV and 
lighting at boarding points may be that the Leeds SP survey was conducted in winter 
shortly after national media coverage of a series of serious assaults, including a 
murder, at bus stops.  
c. The penalty used to represent paucity of facilities at rail stations was chosen without 
any study of the facilities actually available (it was apparently thought safe to assume 
ƚŚĂƚĂŶ “ŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ?ǀĂůƵĞǁŽƵůĚďĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ32). Subsequent investigation of 
facilities at stations close to the NGT route indicates that, even assuming the Leeds SP 
values to be correct, the penalty is much higher than can be justified
33
.  
iv. That people would have no aversion to having to stand on the trolleybus (SP studies 
generally indicate that passengers have a strong aversion to standing and, although the 
Leeds SP work showed this effect
34
 and although a significant proportion of trolleybus 
passengers would have to stand
35
, this was not allowed for in the mode choice model). If 
ƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌƐ ?ĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƚŽƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂůůŽǁĞĚĨŽƌŝƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŽĨĨƐĞƚ
ƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƚŚĞ “ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?ĨƌŽŵŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚĨacilities at bus stops36.  
v. That all trolleybus passengers would be able to board the first trolley to arrive at a given 
stop (a goal which would not be achievable in practice)
37
. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Leeds values with a maximum of the other values. Section C6 of NWLTF122 indicates that the Leeds values 
are about double those found elsewhere. 
32
   Stated in para 4.10 of C-2-8 and confirmed by Mr Chadwick under cross-examination. 
33
   See section C12 in NWLTF122 
34
   The Leeds SP revealed a disinclination to stand but it was somewhat lower than that generally found  W 
probably because the survey sample had excluded concessionary travellers who choose to travel outside 
the morning peak period  W see C8 of NWLTF122. 
35
   No decision has yet been taken on the internal configuration of the trolleybus vehicles but APP108 indicates 
ƐŽŵĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƌĂŶŐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵ “E'd ? ? ?ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ? ? ?ŽĨǁŚŽŵ ? ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞƐĞĂƚĞĚ ?ƚŽ “E'd ? ? ?ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ? ? ? ?
of whom 40 could be seated). The promoters indicate that, if NGT1 were selected, then 10% of passenger 
minutes would be spent without a seat. However, as is demonstrated in section C7 of NWLTF122, an 
analysis of predicted demand profiles shows that, to ensure that capacity is available to meet average 
demand during the busiest 15 minute periods at the busiest stops, NGT3 would have to be selected. This 
implies fewer seats and would result in passengers having to stand at most times of day and a majority 
would have to stand at the busiest times.  
36
   Ĩd ?ƐAECOM review of soft factors indicated, on page 191, that having a seat was the most important public 
transport attribute in all the studies which examined it. As noted above, section C8 of NWLTF122 indicates 
that the Leeds SP values for crowding are out of line with research elsewhere. Values quoted by the DfT 
review from studies in Dublin and in Australia suggest that not having a seat would reduce the journey 
utility by about 65 pence (see Section C8 of NWLTF122). An analysis of predicted demand and available 
seating (see section C7 of NWLTF122) shows that there would be no spare seats available for passengers 
boarding at stops along much of the route at most times of day ?dŚĞƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌƐ ?ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
likely to be that crowding is to be expected on most journeys. If we assume that they expect not to get a 
seat on half of their journeys we should divide the 65p by two. This gives an average  penalty of 32 pence 
which, when translated in to minutes using the value of time used in the original work, gives a penalty of 
13.3 minutes  W which is significantly greater than the 5.8 minute advantage associated with superior 
facilities at boarding points. The consultants suggest a different way of looking at the perception of seat 
availability  W namely the percentage of passenger hours which would be travelled without a seat. Figures for 
NGT3, provided in Table 1 of APP108, indicate that about 22.5% of trolleybus passenger hours would be 
without a seat in 2016  W rising to 26.5% in 2031. Dividing the 65 pence by an average of these two gives a 
penalty of about 16 pence which equates to 6.6 minutes. Even this lower figure more than outweighs the 
5.8 minute average benefit which was assumed to come from trolleybus stops having better facilities than 
those at bus stops.  
37
   Calculations in Section C7 of NWLTF122 show that the predicted demand would, at some points, exceed the 
legal maximum capacity of trolleybuses (160) and that it is unrealistic to imagine that this can be overcome 
by running extra vehicles at these times. It is thus inevitable that some would-be passengers would be 
vi. That car drivers would choose to use the trolleybus park and ride sites (and thus 
contribute revenue to the trolleybuses) rather than drive into the city centre even if, 
ceteris paribus, use of the park and ride sites increased their door to door travel time by 
an hour
38
.  
vii. That the bus operator would not make a serious and sustained attempt to compete with 
the trolleybus
39
.  For example by:  
a. maintaining frequencies (a sensitivity test of the consequences of bus frequencies 
simply being maintained suggested that this would reduce trolleybus revenues by 
4%
40
 but the main appraisal assumes that this would not happen) 
b. cutting fares (this assumption was not even subject to a sensitivity test  W despite the 
ĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚďƵƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌƐ ?ǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĐƵƚĨĂƌĞƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŐĂŝŶŵĂƌŬĞƚƐŚĂƌĞŝƐ
already evident from the £1 fares from the Arndale Centre to the University)
41
 
c. introducing the newest, most comfortable, buses on the #1 and #6 routes (again, this 
assumption was not even subject to a sensitivity test
 
)
42
 
d. taking steps to reduce dwell times  - for example through greater use of cashless 
fares (again, this assumption this assumption was not even subject to a sensitivity 
test)  
2. It appears that no tests of the sensitivity of the revenue forecasts to these dubious 
assumptions have been conducted but it is clear that their replacement by more 
reasonable/evidence-based assumptions would seriously reduce the predicted revenue for the 
trolleybus
43
 . 
3. A precise estimate of the implications for revenue is impossible without access to the models 
but, given the impact of the above factors on generalised costs, it would be unsafe to assume 
that patronage would be more than half that forecast in the Business Case
44
.  If patronage 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
denied access to the first trolleybus to arrive (thereby increasing waiting times and reducing the 
attractiveness of the trolleybus relative to other modes). 
38
   This is because the car parking model has large negative Alternative-Specific Constants (ASCs). The carpark-
specific penalty for city centre parks is around zero (see para 4.5.1.3 and Figure 11 in C-1-3) while that for 
the park and ride sites is minus 70 minutes (Mr Hanson confirmed, under cross-examination, that the 
Bodington and Stourton Park and Ride sites were assumed to be as attractive as the rail based park and ride 
sites at Garforth and Pudsey and that they were therefore given an ASC of minus 70 minutes based on the 
average ASC for those two sites - see para 4.5.1.1 and table 15 in C-1-3 ). In fact, as argued in the first bullet 
of section B3.2 in NWLTF122, there is good reason to suggest that a trolleybus-based P&R service would be 
perceived as less attractive than ones based on rail. 
39
   Para 3.45 of Webtag Unit 3.15.3 (Inquiry doc E-3-22) notes the need to allow for the effects of competition 
from existing operators. It recommends including likely effects in the main forecast and using sensitivity 
testing to explore other effects. Sensitivity tests are detailed in C-1-9,  in APP-5-3 and in APP-7-3 but no test 
of the effect of a reduction in bus fares, of introducing new buses, or of reducing dwell times, is mentioned 
there or anywhere else in the evidence. 
40
   ^ĞĞƌĞƐƵůƚĨŽƌ “,ŝŐŚŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶdĂďůĞ ?ŝŶ-1-9. 
41
   The modelling has assumed that trolleybus fares would be similar to those on buses  W see C-1-6. k could)  
42
   The modelling has assumed that, in the trolleybus scenario, the bus service would be provided by buses of a 
ƚǇƉĞǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ “ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞ>ĞĞĚƐ^WǁŽƌŬŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌƐǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂ
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚďĞŶĞĨŝƚŝĨƚŚĞďƵƐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞǁĞƌĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇ “ŶĞǁďƵƐĞƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďǇƚŚĞƚŚĞŶ “ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ?ďƵƐĞƐ ? 
43
   If the aspiration-based 5.5 minute preference for trolleybuses were replaced by a more reasonable figure, if 
ƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌƐ ?ĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƚŽƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐǁĞƌĞĂůůŽǁĞĚĨŽƌ ?ĂŶĚŝĨĂŵŽƌĞĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĂŝůƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞ
allowed for, the trolleybus would have littůĞŽƌŶŽ “ƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ?ŽǀĞƌŽƚŚĞƌŵŽĚĞƐĂŶĚŝƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞ
to compete solely on the basis of the journey time differential, hampered by the fact that people would 
know that they would often have no seat if they used the trolleybus.  
44
   If trolleybus patronage were halved (but if its services remain as planned), people could be fairly sure of 
getting a seat on the trolleybus and so the advantage of the superior boarding point facilities would no 
longer be negated by the aversion to crowding and so a reduction to less than half is unlikely. 
were halved but trolleybus service levels were maintained at planned levels
45
, the annual 
revenue would fall from £16.02m
46
 to around £8m while annual costs would remain around 
£7.41
47
. An annual revenue surplus of less than £0.59 would not even cover the interest on the 
 ? ? ?ŵŽĨƚŚĞ “ƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂůďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽŚĞůƉĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƚŚĞƚƌŽůůĞǇďƵƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ? 
4. Given the importance of the revenue issue, the consultants should, as a matter of urgency, be 
asked to produce a run of the model in which the assumptions listed in section B.1 are 
replaced by more realistic ones. Namely, a run with: 
i. ƚŚĞƚƌŽůůĞǇďƵƐ ?Ɛ ? ? ?ŵŝŶƵƚĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐĞƚƚŽǌero,  
ii. the bus and trolleybus boarding point penalties reduced to 3.5 and 0.6 respectively
48
, 
iii. the rail boarding point penalty reduced from 9.4 minutes to 2.1 minutes
49
, 
iv. a penalty added to trolleybus trips to represent the likelihood of crowding (an accurate 
representation of crowding would not be possible without further model development 
but a proxy could be applied via an average penalty based on average loadings at a given 
time of day. An average figure of 6.6 minutes would seem fair
50
),   
v. bus dwell times reduced by (say) 33% (to reflect faster the boarding times achievable 
through greater use of cashless fares),  
vi. the frequency of the #1 and #6 buses kept at their current levels (to compete with 
trolleybus), and 
vii. a reduction of (say) 25% in bus fares in the NGT corridor offset by bus fare increases in 
the rest of the network (to compete with trolleybus while maintaining overall bus 
revenues). 
 
C. What implications would local control of buses (via a Quality Bus Contract or as part of a 
devolution agreement) have for the Trolleybus project? 
1. Part of the rationale for selecting trolleybus as the NGT vehicle was that it enabled the 
promoters to apply for a Transport Works Act Order (TWAO). This was thought desirable 
because it would give the promoter control of the services and allow them to keep the 
revenues. The revenues on the A660 are particularly attractive and explain why that corridor 
was selected for the trolleybus.  A Quality Bus Contract (QBC), or the powers for devolved 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐƚƌĂŝůĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?YƵĞĞŶ ?Ɛ^ƉĞĞĐŚ ?ǁŽƵůĚŐŝǀĞƚŚĞŽŵďŝŶĞĚƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?tz ?
control of bus services and would allow them to keep any surplus revenues.  
2. Given control of bus services, WYCA could rationalise bus services to make sure that the buses 
did not compete with it. However, if the Combined Authority had control of revenues, any 
financial case for introducing a trolleybus would disappear because the increased costs of 
providing public transport would exceed the expected increase in total public transport 
revenues. Introduction of NGT would thus result in an ongoing drain in the resources available 
                                                             
45
    If services were cut to reduce costs, the problem of seat shortage would re-emerge and the equilibrium 
demand level would fall further. 
46
   Table 12.14 in C-1 shows annual revenues of £16.02m. 
47
   Table 11.3 in C-1 identifies £5.41m annual operating cost while para 11.35 in C-1 identifies £2m annual 
infrastructure maintenance costs. 
48
   Reflecting the fact that the analysis presented in section C6 of NWLTF122 suggested that the penalties 
derived from the Leeds SP work were about double those found elsewhere. 
49
   A figure of 4.2 minutes is justified in section C12 of NWLTF122 but this should be halved in order to reflect 
the recommended halving of the equivalent penalties for bus and trolleybus. 
50
   Based on calculations in footnote 32 above 
for public transport.  The scale of this annual drain on resources can be calculated in various 
ways
51,52,53
 but is likely to be around £3m per annum.  
 
D. Were the performance and impacts of the trolleybus scheme accurately modelled? 
1. There are serious concerns about the use, within the mode choice model, of quality factors 
whose values are not supported by evidence. Specifically: 
i. The assumption, despite contrary evidence from the Leeds SP study, that people would 
prefer to travel on a trolleybus than on any other public transport vehicle (see B.1.i 
above), 
ii. The use of boarding-point quality factors which are considerably higher than those 
found elsewhere (see footnote 27  above), 
iii.  The use of unjustifiably high penalty factors for use of rail (see B.1.i and B.1.iii.c above). 
2. There are serious concerns about the failure to consider the limits on the capacity of trolleybus 
vehicles
54
. The models represent traffic congestion and of crowding on rail services but have no 
representation of crowding or seat availability on buses or trolleybuses. The failure to consider 
crowding on buses may be justified by the fact that, in an incremental demand model, it is 
unnecessary to represent a continuation of a pre-existing condition. Also, although it may be 
assumed that extra buses would be deployed if demand were to exceed supply, this 
assumption is not realistic for trolleǇďƵƐĞƐ ?ƐĞĞƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨEt>d& ? ? ? ? ?'ŝǀĞŶƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌƐ ?
well-known aversion to standing, the failure to consider the practical limits on trolleybus 
capacity limits on the carrying is a serious flaw. 
3. There are concerns about the accuracy of the traffic assignment model. For example: 
i. The representation of the A660/Shaw Lane junction appears to be seriously deficient 
(the flows predicted for the base year are very different from reality
55
). Given that the 
performance of this junction is critical for the corridor as a whole, it is clearly important 
that it is correctly represented. Indeed, given that it needs to be coordinated with the 
junctions at Alma road and North Lane, it would seem appropriate to consider some 
form of detailed simulation modelling of this part of the network. 
                                                             
51
   Table 21.1 of C-1 indicates a net NGT surplus of £3m p.a. while Table 21.3 indicates a net loss to bus 
operators of £6.3m. This indicates a net loss for the combined (bus + NGT) service of around £3.3m p.a.   If 
rail services are included in the equation then the net loss is greater because, while there would be little 
opportunity to reduce rail costs, rail revenues are likely to fall by around £1.3m p.a. (Table 12.14 of C-1 
shows that about 8.5% of NGT trips would have been abstracted from rail, 8.5% of the £16.02m NGT 
revenue is £1.35m). This suggests an annual loss for all public transport services of £4.6m.    
52
   The annual cost of providing bus and NGT services would be about £7.5m greater than that of providing bus 
services alone. This figure comprises £4.15m net increase in operating costs (see Table 11.3 of C-1), around 
£2m for NGT infrastructure maintenance (see para 11.35 of C-1) and around £1.4m to service the £35m 
debt. This £7.5m is of course offset by increased revenues but, even accepting the (arguably inflated) 
revenues presented in Table 12.14 of C-1, this is likely to be less than £4m p.a. (Table 12.14 shows that 
around 75% of NGT trips would have been abstracted from other modes of public transport. If the 25% that 
are genuinely new are assumed to contribute 25% of the predicted £16.02m annual revenue, then the extra 
revenue is only £4m p.a.). This indicates a net loss of around £3.5m p.a. (£7.5m minus £4m). 
53
   Table 21.3 in C-1 shows that non-NGT public transport revenues would fall by £8.3m. The forecast revenue 
for trolleybus is shown, in table 12.14, as £16.02m. £16.02 minus £8.3 is £7.72 which is similar to the £7.5m 
of additional cost calculated in footnote 48 above but, as argued in B.3 above, there is good reason to 
believe that trolleybus revenues would be substantially less than £16.02m p.a. 
54
   See section D2 of NWLTF122. 
55
   See C11 of NWLTF122 and original data from APP103 
ii. The inaccurate representation of turning movements at the A660/Shaw Lane junction 
and of the flows on rat-runs such as Moor Road and Weetwood Lane
56
, indicates that 
the model cannot be relied on to show the effects of the scheme on local traffic.
57
 
4. There are concerns about the accuracy of the representation of local access links. For example, 
zone centroid connectors in Headingley are linked into the walk network at locations which will 
have distorted the predicted usage of individual boarding points and will have tended to 
exaggerate the accessibility of the trolleybus relative to other public transport modes (most 
particularly relative to rail and buses #19 and 56)
58
. 
5. There are serious concerns about the Park and Ride model: 
i. The fact that attempts to calibrate the parking model resulted in extraordinarily large 
car-park-ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚƐĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽĞŵƉůŽǇĂŶƵŶƵƐƵĂů “Ĩŝǆ ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇĐĂƌĐŽƐƚƐ
are factored up and public transport costs are factored down
59
.  
ii. The fact that the predicted demand includes a significant element of reverse-flow traffic 
(drivers driving out to a P&R site in order to ride back in again) and that the Stourton 
P&R site apparently fails to attract any users from the Wakefield area
60
. 
6. There are serious concerns about the Urban Dynamic Model: 
i. The fact that it has ignored the predicted increases the cost and duration of journeys by 
car (see footnote 19 above) 
ii. The fact that its prediction of increased employment is largely
61
 due to the quality 
benefits which, despite evidence from the Leeds SP work, were attributed to travel on 
trolleybuses.   
iii. The fact that, because the model looked only at public transport users, it was unable to 
reflect the fact that overall transport costs (summed over all modes and time periods) 
are predicted to increase if the trolleybus scheme goes ahead
62
.  
 
E. Is the result of the Cost Benefit Analysis credible? 
1. dŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞůŝƚƚůĞĚŽƵďƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƐĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĞŶĞĨŝƚŽƐƚZĂƚŝŽ ?Z ?
has been exaggerated: 
i. About a quarter
63 ?ŽĨƚŚĞ “ƚŝŵĞƐĂǀŝŶŐďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?ŝƐĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĨĂĐƚŽƌƐǁŚŝĐŚ
were assumed to be associated with use of trolleybus but which, as noted in B.1.i above, 
are contrary to the results of the Leeds SP study.  
                                                             
56
   See C14 of NWLTF122 and original  data from APP103 
57
   It is accepted that the assignment passed the normal DfT tests but these relate to the network as a whole  W 
the assignment may be acceptable at the strategic level but its inability to represent local traffic must limit 
its usefulness for detailed analysis of the type required to model impacts of capacity-critical systems such as 
NGT.  
58
   See Section D1of NWLTF122 (particularly the bulleted points at the end of section D1.a) 
59
   Mr Hanson conceded, under cross-examination, that the parking model was not as good as he would wish 
and that its predictions could not be regarded as accurate to within plus or minus 50%. Paragraph 4.5.1.3 of 
C-1- ? ?ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉĂƌŬŝŶŐŵŽĚĞů ?Ɛ^Ɛ ?ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƌĞĨůĞĐƚǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĂŶĚŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ
input data. TŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ “Ĩŝǆ ?ŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚ ? ?ŽĨEt>d& ? ? ? ? 
60
    Data in APP147, discussion in B39 of NWLTF122. 
61
    Mr Chadwick accepted, under cross-ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚĂďŽƵƚŚĂůĨŽĨƚŚĞƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚ “ƚƌĂǀĞůƚŝŵĞƐĂǀŝŶŐƐ ?ĨŽƌ
public transport users were actually attributable to the quality factors. Calculations in C1 of NWLTF suggest 
that the contribution may be higher than that. 
62
   See A.1.v above 
63
   Mr Chadwick accepted, under cross-examination, that about half of the ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚ “ƚƌĂǀĞůƚŝŵĞƐĂǀŝŶŐƐ ?ĨŽƌ
public transport users were actually attributable to the quality factors. The total average quality factor is 
ii. ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƋƵĂƌƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ “ƚŝŵĞƐĂǀŝŶŐďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?ŝƐĚĞƌived from the value placed on the 
superior facilities to be provided at trolleybus boarding points but there is good reason 
to believe that too high a value has been placed on these aspects
64
.  
iii. EŽĂůůŽǁĂŶĐĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞĨŽƌƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌƐ ?ǁĞůů-known aversion to standing. 
Discussion at B.1.iv above indicates that correct allowance for this aversion would more 
than outweigh all the benefit assumed to result from the fact that facilities at trolleybus 
boarding points would be better than those at bus stops. 
iv. No allowance has been made for the value of the health disbenefits associated with the 
reduced use of active modes
65
. 
v. The benefit has not been reduced to allow for a number of other factors which, although 
difficult to quantify without access to the models, would certainly result in reduced 
 “ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞZ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ P 
a. delays to trolleybus passengers unable to board the first vehicle to arrive (likely to 
ŽĐĐƵƌƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĞǀĞŶǁŝƚŚ “E'd ? ?ĂŶĚŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞŝĨ ?ŝŶĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŵŽƌĞ
than the minimum number of seats, trolleybus capacities are lower than 160),  
b. loss of passenger utility caused by any reduction in the provision of bus services other 
than the #1 and #6 due to loss of revenues to trolleybus (services #28, #92 and #97 
are perhaps most obviously at risk). 
vi. ŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐŝĞƐǁŽƵůĚƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐƚŽ
about zero and thus reduce the estimate of overall benefit by about 50%. This would 
result in a BCR of about 1.5
66
.  
 
2. The calculation of wider benefits which, although not included in the calculation of the Benefit 
Cost Ratio, are relied on in the Business Case. They are exaggerated in that: 
i. They exclude the loss in value of the heritage/landscape assets which would be 
adversely affected by the scheme (despite recent DfT guidance indicating that this 
impact should be included)
67
. 
ii. They include a benefit attributed to reduced journey time variability which is 
exaggerated because it was calculated for the in-vehicle part of the journey rather than 
for the full door-to door journey
68
.  
iii. They include the assumed increase in employment predicted by the UDM (see D6 
above). 
3. The baseline used to calculate the benefits (the Do Minimum Scenario) is unduly pessimistic in 
that: 
i. it does not allow for the value which, according to the Leeds SP study, people put on 
travelling on new buses (it was, in effect, assumed that, if NGT does not proceed, the 
route would for ever be served by buses which were the norm in 2009
69
).  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
11.3 minutes (see B.1.iii above). The disputed 5.5 minutes is about half (5.5/11.3) of this total. Thus the 
disputed figure is about a quarter of the total benefit. 
64
    As noted at B.1.iiia above. 
65
   Recent DfT guidance indicates that this effect should be allowed for and section C17 of NWLTF122 
estimates that it could be a disbenefit of up to £4.2m). 
66
   APP-7-3.2 shows benefits of £438m and costs ŽĨ ? ? ? ?ŵ ?ZĞŵŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵ “ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ǁŽƵůĚ
reduce benefit to about £220m giving a BCR of 1.45. However, a more accurate estimate would require a re-
run of the models  W use of the run recommended at B.4 above would be an obvious first step. 
67
   See section C16 of NWLTF122. 
68
   See discussion in para B69 of NWLTF122. 
69
   2009 was the date of the SP survey.  
ii. it assumes: 
a. very modest improvement in the quality of rail travel (despite on-going initiatives) 
b. no significant improvement in bus stop facilities (despite there being a Metro policy 
of continued improvements ) 
c. no saving in bus boarding time associated with roll-out of smart ticketing (which is 
already underway) 
4. The deficiencies in the Leeds Transport Model (see D above) will, on balance, have resulted in 
forecasts which were unduly favourable to the scheme. 
5. dŚĞŶĞƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞĂďŽǀĞǁŝůůŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚŽĞǆĂŐŐĞƌĂƚĞƚŚĞŶĞƚďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ “WƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ
ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?W ?ƐĐheme. It seems reasonable to assume that correction of all the above 
would leave the estimated BCR well below 1.5 (note that the 2012 DfT approval letter 
70
 
indicates that approval of the Final Business Case is contingent on the BCR not falling 
substantially below 2.7).  
 
F. Were alternative solutions properly investigated? 
1. EĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĞ “EĞǆƚĞƐƚůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?E ?ŶŽƌƚŚĞ “>ŽǁŽƐƚůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?> ?ĂƌĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ
attempts to show what could be achieved by other means if there were a will to do so
71
. As 
such they are constructs of little value.  
i. Given that the NBA has no identified source of funding, it has no more relevance than 
any other unfunded scheme. It would have been much more useful to have shown what 
could be achieved by, for example, significant investment in rail-based Park and Ride 
and/or tram-train investment, combined with enhanced bus priority and minor traffic 
management measures in the NGT corridor. 
ii. Notwithstanding the above, it is clearly useful to be aware of the likely performance of 
alternatively-powered vehicles using the trolleybus alignment. Unsurprisingly, because it 
requires similar infrastructure and has its own set of stops separate from bus stops, the 
NBA produces almost all the same disbenefits as the trolleybus
72
.  It is predicted to 
attract fewer passengers than trolleybus because it has been assumed that it would be 
less attractive to potential passengers. However, this assumption is highly questionable 
(there is nothing in the results of the Leeds SP work to warrant it) and a sensitivity test
73
 
shows that, if it were perceived as the trolleybus is assumed to be, it would achieve a 
BCR of 3.49 (which is greater than the 2.90 predicted for the PA). 
iii. The LCA was very poorly specified: 
a. The bus priority measures which were specified give no significant reduction in bus 
run times. No attempt appears to have been made to consider additional bus priority 
measures (and those measures which were included give, inexplicably, less benefit in 
the LCA than they do in the PA
74
). 
b. Given that the Leeds SP showed that improvements to bus stops would be very cost 
effective, the LCA should have included very significant investment in such 
                                                             
70
   See condition iii of the July 2012 Programme Entry Approval letter  W C-6-15. 
71
   This was clearly stated by Mr Chadwick several times during his evidence and cross examination. See Section 
D5 of NWLTF122 for a fuller discussion of the consideration that was given to alternatives. 
72
   The main difference would be that the particular costs and aesthetic disbenefits associated with the use of 
trolleybus technology would be avoided. 
73
   dŚĞ “ĨƵůůƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?EƚĞƐƚƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚŝŶWW-7-3.5  
74
   See Section C4 in NWLTF122 
improvements. However the assumed improvement is limited
75
 (and, inexplicably, 
the unit costs of improvements appear to be assumed to be higher in the LCA than in 
the PA
76
). 
c. Give that the Leeds SP showed that passengers would perceive significant benefit 
from the introduction of new buses, the LCA should have allowed for the introduction 
of new buses rather than the continued use of old diesel engine stock.  
d. The traffic signal settings devised for the PA were assumed to be employed in the LCA 
 W they were not optimised for the LCA and so under-estimate what could be achieved 
in terms of network performance in a LCA scenario
77
. 
e. The possibility of improvements in traffic management in the centre of Headingley 
(around North Lane) has been ignored
78
. 
f. No improvement in bus boarding times has been allowed for (despite the clear 
potential for this via improved ticketing, use of smart cards and, potentially, of buses 
with multiple doors and two staircases).   
g. The rail stock has been assumed to remain unimproved.  
 
 
                                                             
75
    Answer 1 in APP103 shows that the bus stop penalty in the LCA is, at 5.4, only slightly lower than that in the 
Do Minimum case  W whereas, as reported in answer 2, the penalty for trolleybus stops is reduced to 1.3. 
76
   Answer 7 in APP103 reveals that £2.96m was assumed to be required to improve 52 bus stops in the LCA 
while £0.5m was thought sufficient to cover replacement of 66 bus stops in the PA. 
77
   See para B60 in NWLTF122  W referring back to para 2.31 of REB-OBJ1719.3 
78
   A discussion document outlining such improvements, and public opinions regarding them, has been 
produced by NWLTF and appears on their  website: 
http://www.nwltf.org.uk/docs/ngt/Alternative%20Transport%20Strategy%20discussion%20doc.pdf  
